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Tunneling as an Incentive for Earnings Management 
during the IPO Process in China 
 
Abstract 
 
Using a sample of 185 Chinese IPO firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
during the period 1999 to 2001, we show that related party (RP) sales of goods and 
services could be used opportunistically to manage earnings upwards in the pre-IPO 
period. We also provide evidence that such behavior may be motivated by the prospect of 
tunneling opportunities in the post-IPO period, i.e., exploiting economic resources from 
minority shareholders for the benefit of the parent company. We provide evidence of one 
such opportunistic tunneling tool: non-repayment by Chinese parent companies of net 
outstanding corporate loans made to them by their newly listed subsidiaries. Furthermore, 
we provide evidence in support of our assertion of an association between such tunneling 
behavior in the post-IPO period and earnings management via abnormal RP sales in the 
pre-IPO period. Finally, we demonstrate the apparent failure of investors in Chinese IPOs 
to perceive the link between the two phenomena. The results enhance understanding of the 
motives for and consequences of earnings manipulation during the IPO process. They 
highlight a potential additional investment risk facing foreign investors in China’s capital 
markets as well as in Chinese firms cross-listed in non-Chinese stock exchanges, and have 
policy implications for China and other emerging markets which need to improve the 
protection of minority shareholders’ rights. 
 
Keywords: Related party transactions; Earnings management; Tunneling; Initial public 
offering. 
 
JEL classification: G34, G38, M41,  
 
Data availability: The data used in this study are available from public sources identified 
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1. Introduction 
This paper makes a twofold contribution to the literature that deals with earnings 
management behavior in Chinese companies in the setting where state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) spin off their profitable units as newly listed companies. First, unlike prior US-
based studies that used aggregate accruals as their measure of earnings management (e.g., 
Aharony et al., 1993; Friedlan, 1994; Teoh et al., 1998), we study related party 
transactions (RPTs) as earnings management tools during the initial public offering (IPO) 
process.1 Following McNichols (2000), we concur that notwithstanding their important 
contribution and impact, “further progress in the literature will require a departure from 
extensive reliance on aggregate accruals approaches” (p. 314). In particular, we show that 
the pattern of related party (RP) sales of goods and services (hereafter “RP sales”) of the 
to-be-listed unit (hereafter the “IPO firm”) to its parent company is associated with the 
pattern of the IPO firms’ return on assets (ROA) in a fashion that indicates earnings 
management (as reported in Aharony et al., 2000). 
Second, we extend the motives offered in the literature for such opportunistic 
behavior. Several studies that examine US IPO data (e.g., Aharony et al., 1993; Friedlan, 
1994; Teoh et al., 1998) suggest that such manipulation may be induced by the desire of 
managers to increase their wealth by increasing the value of stock retained and cash 
receipts from the partial disposition of existing stock. Similarly, Chinese SOE managers 
may be induced to inflate the issuance price at IPO in order to raise more funds for 
disposal by the parent SOE. We extend this motivation suggesting that inflating earnings 
in the pre-IPO period is motivated by the prospect of tunneling opportunities in the post-
IPO period. 
                                                 
1 Similarly to the requirements set forth by SFAS 57 in the US, current Chinese accounting standards require publicly 
listed companies to disclose all material RPTs in the form of notes to the financial statements. RPTs are defined to 
include transactions occurring between a listed firm and its parent company (including the parent company’s other 
affiliates) or with other related parties such as the second largest corporate shareholder. A detailed discussion of RPTs is 
provided in Section 2:  Institutional Background. 
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Following Johnson et al.’s (2000) description of tunneling as “the transfer of 
assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of those who control them,” in this paper the 
term relates to parent companies of Chinese IPO firms that exploit minority shareholders 
by siphoning off economic resources from the IPO firms. Anecdotal evidence indicates 
that Chinese parent companies frequently do not pay their debts to their listed companies 
and that this is a major reason for the untimely demise of many newly listed firms. 
Existing studies also show that corporate loans are a main form of tunneling in Chinese 
listed companies. 
Examining a large set of RPTs between Hong Kong listed companies and their 
controlling shareholders, Cheung et al. (2006) provide supporting empirical evidence that 
such corporate loans are a-priori likely to result in expropriation of minority shareholders. 
Cheung et al. (2008) examine a sample of RPTs, including corporate loans, between 
Chinese publicly listed firms and their controlling shareholders during 2001-2002. They 
report negative cumulative abnormal market-adjusted returns (CAR) at the announcement 
of RP corporate loans. Specifically, the mean and the median five-day CAR are -1.2% and 
-1.1%, respectively, with the median value loss representing 24.8% of the value of the 
transaction. They interpret this as evidence of tunneling of minority shareholders, rather 
than transactions with related parties based on an economic rationale. The severity of this 
phenomenon eventually led to regulatory actions by the Chinese authorities. Since 2003, a 
series of regulations and rules have been promulgated to proscribe RP corporate loans and 
induce payment by parent companies for loans already made.2
To provide evidence in support of this assertion, we first show that parent SOEs 
exploit the minority shareholders (those who bought in at IPO) by not repaying 
outstanding corporate loans obtained from these IPO firms. Then, we provide evidence of 
                                                 
2 This is discussed in detail in Section 4 (within the subsection titled “Univariate Analysis of Tunneling Variables”). 
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an association between earnings management via increase in RP sales in the pre-IPO 
period and tunneling via increase in RP non-repaid net corporate loans in the post-IPO 
period.3
To investigate these issues further, we examine the post-IPO share price 
performance of the newly issued firms and document return underperformance for firms 
that engaged in earnings management in the pre-IPO period and subsequent tunneling in 
the post-IPO period. These results indicate that investors in Chinese IPOs fail to perceive 
the relationship between earnings management via increase in RP sales in the pre-IPO 
period and tunneling via increase in RP non-repaid corporate loans in the post-IPO period. 
We also document: (1) post-IPO return underperformance for firms whose parent 
company engaged in earnings management in the pre-IPO period but no subsequent 
tunneling in the post-IPO period; (2) post-IPO return underperformance for firms with 
tunneling in the post-IPO period but no prior earnings management in the pre-IPO period. 
These results indicate that the market does not “see through” either earnings management 
via increase in RP sales in the pre-IPO period or tunneling via increase in RP non-repaid 
corporate loans in the post-IPO period. 
 Our sample consists of 185 newly listed Chinese IPO firms that made a first-time 
issue of common shares to the public on the Shanghai Stock Exchange during the period 
1999 to 2001. We use Chinese IPOs to examine these issues because China provides both 
a unique institutional setting and RPT data (see Section 2 for details). In China, most 
listed companies are spin-offs from large SOEs but still have very close business ties with 
the parent. They typically form a business group with their parent companies, rather than 
becoming stand-alone companies. In addition, investment banks are allowed to nominate 
                                                 
3 RP corporate loans are typically reported as “other receivables” and “other payables” on the balance sheet of the 
Chinese IPO firms. Outstanding net corporate loans provided by IPO firms to their parent companies refer to RP other 
receivables net of RP other payables. In this paper we use the change in RP net other receivables as our proxy of non-
repaid net corporate loans. This is discussed in detail in Section 4 (within the subsection titled “Univariate Analysis of 
Tunneling Variables”). 
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firms for public listing and their nominations are screened by an independent listing 
committee of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). The independent 
listing committee assesses the qualifications of a to-be-listed company based on the 
operational and financial information it submits. Consequently, managers of Chinese 
parent companies may have strong incentives to engage in RPTs to prop up the earnings 
of the companies they are about to spin off in order to raise more capital from minority 
shareholders and then tunnel their assets or profits back during the post-IPO period. 
Chinese IPOs also report detailed RPT information in their prospectuses. As of 
1997, Chinese accounting standards require all publicly listed companies to publish RPT 
information in their financial statements. Prior to 1999, to-be-listed units could not be 
legally separated from their parent companies. Consequently, their pre-IPO financial 
statements are on a pro forma basis. As of 1999, the CSRC requires all IPO firms to 
legally separate from their parent companies or other affiliated parties at least one year 
prior to the IPO. Thus we are allowed at least one year of RPT data prior to the IPO year 
and can investigate patterns of RPTs between IPO firms and their controlling parent 
companies before and after the IPO process. 
The paper has, at least, four implications. First, the results cast doubt on the 
Chinese capital markets’ reputation for semi-strong efficiency. We find that pre-IPO 
earnings management via RP sales and post-IPO tunneling via RP corporate loans are 
overlooked by investors, resulting in post-IPO stock underperformance. These results 
suggest that Chinese capital markets do not fully and rapidly impound information into 
share prices when the information on RPTs is published in IPO financial reports. 
Second, the results have policy implications for China and other emerging markets 
with weak protection of minority shareholders. The Chinese government has been taking 
action to address the earnings management and resource tunneling issues identified in the 
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paper. As we show, parent-subsidiary structure directly causes the opportunistic earnings 
management behavior in the pre-IPO period. To prevent this, since 2006, the Chinese 
government has been encouraging unlisted SOEs to take the entire entity public, rather 
than carving out sub-units. To improve minority shareholders’ protection, in 2003 the 
Chinese government also proscribed RP loans, thus reducing the opportunistic use of 
corporate loans for tunneling. The ban on corporate loans is consistent with the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 in the US which makes it unlawful for any public company to provide 
loans to its executive officers and directors. Since June 2006, the Chinese government has 
also gradually been allowing non-tradable shares held by parent companies to be traded 
on the stock exchange. The floating of shares may also reduce the incentive of parent 
companies to expropriate minority shareholders through corporate loans. All these actions 
and policy changes are means to reduce the opportunistic earnings management and 
resource tunneling addressed in this paper.  
Third, Chinese capital markets are growing rapidly and attracting investors from 
many other countries. We reveal additional investment risks to foreign investors in 
China’s capital markets as well as in Chinese firms cross-listed in non-Chinese stock 
exchanges from earnings management and resource tunneling. On November 5, 2002, the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the People’s Bank of China 
(PBOC) introduced the QFII (Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor) program as a 
provision for foreign capital to access China’s financial markets. As of January 2008, a 
total of 52 foreign institutions have received QFII licenses with quotas ranging from 
US$50 million to US$800 million, amounting to around US$10 billion authorized for 
investment in the Chinese markets. According to our results, special attention should be 
paid by both domestic and foreign investors to listed companies’ related party transactions 
with their parent companies.  
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Finally, we apply a novel methodology, which, to our best knowledge, has not yet 
been presented in the literature, to detect earnings management and resource tunneling. 
The novel methodology may also be applied by future researchers in non-Chinese studies 
concerning earnings management and resource tunneling. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide 
institutional background. Section 3 discusses prior research, incremental contribution and 
our hypotheses. In Section 4 we present the data and in Section 5 we discuss the 
methodology and analyze the results. Section 6 provides a conclusion and limitations. 
 
2. Institutional Background 
Typically, a Chinese SOE originally comprises three main components: profitable 
units, unprofitable units and not-for-profit units such as community schools and hospitals. 
Most of China’s newly listed firms (IPOs) are profitable units spun off from existing 
SOEs (Aharony et al., 2000), a circumstance that allows them considerable room to 
engage in transactions with their parent companies of the type that are the focus of our 
study. The unprofitable and not-for-profit units remain part of the original firm (now the 
parent company of the IPO firm). The newly listed companies typically continue, in the 
post-IPO period, to share with their parent company certain personnel, such as the 
chairperson of the board of directors, brand names, and certain assets. They typically form 
a business group with their parent companies, rather than becoming stand-alone 
companies. Usually, the controlling shareholders (mostly Chinese central or local 
government) hold more than 40% of the total outstanding common shares. In the post-IPO 
period, the parent company may have an incentive to siphon resources partially 
contributed by the new minority shareholders from the IPO firm to the remaining 
unprofitable and non-operational units. One feasible way of doing this is through RPTs, 
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initially boosting earnings of the candidate IPO firm during the IPO process to increase its 
chances of going public successfully and attract more capital from minority shareholders, 
and then tunneling assets from the IPO firm in the post-IPO period. 
Prior to 1999, the total annual number of IPOs was subject to a quota system, 
meaning that the central government set a quota for the entire capital value of shares to be 
issued every year. This total amount would then be allocated among local governments 
which in turn were directed to identify key industries and nominate worthy companies for 
listing on the local Chinese stock exchanges. Under this system, managers may have had 
less of an incentive to induce higher IPO prices by reporting higher earnings because the 
total amount of capital to be raised was fixed. Examining IPOs in an earlier period, 
Aharony et al. (2000) suggest that instead, Chinese SOE managers may have had indirect 
incentives to manage earnings upwards to increase the possibility of their firms being 
qualified for listing, with the resultant higher prestige and other nonpecuniary benefits.  
Since 1999, following the abandoning of the IPO quota system, investment banks 
are allowed to nominate firms for public listing and their nominations are screened by an 
independent listing committee of the CSRC. The independent listing committee assesses 
the qualifications of a to-be-listed company based on the operational and financial 
information it submits. Thus, Chinese managers may inflate earnings to increase the IPO 
issuing price and hence raise more capital from new minority shareholders. 
Current Chinese accounting standards also require detailed disclosures of RP 
transactions. In 1997, the Chinese Ministry of Finance, which serves as the accounting 
standards setter in China, promulgated an accounting standard for RPTs (hereafter, the 
RPT Standard), which requires publicly listed companies to disclose all material RPTs in 
the form of notes to the financial statements. The RPT Standard defines RPTs to include 
transactions occurring between a listed firm and its parent company (including the parent 
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company’s other affiliates) or with other related parties such as the second largest 
corporate shareholder. RPTs may also be between a listed firm and its management, board 
members, principal individual owners, or members of the immediate families of any of 
these groups.  
In our sample IPO firms we observe all RPT disclosures with parent companies. 
We focus on RPT disclosures with parent companies because they are the controlling 
shareholders and thus may have more of an incentive to prop up their affiliated IPOs. 
The RPT Standard requires relatively detailed disclosure of RPTs, similar to the 
requirements set forth by SFAS 57 in the USA.4 Such disclosure must include information 
on the nature of the relationship between the parties involved, the core operations of each 
related party, a description of the nature of each type of transaction, and information on 
the amounts involved. Notably, Chinese IPOs and listed firms are required to disclose in 
their prospectuses and annual reports ending balances of trading accounts, such as 
accounts receivable and other receivables, with their parent companies and other major 
related parties in financial footnotes. In practice, all outstanding credit sales and purchases 
of goods and services between the Chinese IPO firms and their parent companies are 
reported in the year-end balance of “accounts receivable” and “accounts payable”, 
respectively, of the IPO firms. All outstanding RP corporate loans are reported in the year-
end balance of “other receivables” or “other payables” of the Chinese IPO firms. These 
items reported in financial footnotes do not consist of any outstanding loans to/from 
individual shareholders or managers. 
Exhibit 1 lists and briefly describes the various types of RPTs that publicly listed 
firms and IPO firms must disclose in the form of notes to the financial statements, 
according to the RPT Standard. They relate to trade of goods and services, commission 
                                                 
4 See Gordon et al. (2004) for details on RPT disclosure requirements in the US. 
 8
relationships, overhead reimbursements, transfer of R&D, permits and franchises, trade of 
assets other than goods, including exchange of fixed assets, capital and operating leases 
and borrowing or lending, including interest payments. 
 
(Insert Exhibit 1 here) 
 
As of 1999, the CSRC requires all to-be-listed IPO firms to legally separate from 
their parent companies or other affiliates at least one year prior to the IPO and to disclose 
in their IPO prospectuses all material transactions with related parties during the year 
prior to IPO.5 Examining these publicly available data for the purposes of our study 
revealed a tremendous number of RPTs between the IPO firms and their parent 
companies. 
 
3. Prior Research, Incremental Contribution and Hypotheses  
There are numerous studies that investigate earnings management behavior around 
IPOs. Aharony et al. (1993), the first such study, adopt the total accounting accruals 
approach in an attempt to detect earnings management.6 The little evidence they find on 
earnings manipulation shows that it occurs mainly among smaller firms and those with 
larger financial leverage, and that to a lesser degree it is also related to the quality of the 
underwriters and auditors employed when going public.  
Using a similar method but with quarterly data, Friedlan (1994) reports stronger 
evidence on income-increasing discretionary accruals by IPO issuers in the financial 
                                                 
5 Aharony et al. (2000) show that during the restructuring period, Chinese firms are more likely to manage pre-IPO 
earnings through the so-called financial packaging: the original business group carves out the most profitable unit and 
sets it up as the to-be-listed company. However, during 1992-1995, the period examined by Aharony et al. (2000), there 
was no clear distinction between the to-be-listed unit and its affiliates such as the parent company, nor were there any 
observable RPTs. Hence, they do not examine how exactly the financial package is formed prior to an IPO or what are 
the repercussions on resource allocation in the post-IPO period. 
6 This approach was first suggested by Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986, 1988). 
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statements released before going public. Using the modified Jones (1991) discretionary 
accrual model, Teoh et al. (1998) provide evidence of income-increasing accruals around 
IPOs.7 Aharony et al. (2000) are the first to examine the IPO-related earnings 
management phenomenon in the emerging Chinese capital markets. Measuring earnings 
performance and accruals for a sample of 83 newly listed firms, they provide similar 
evidence of earnings manipulation by Chinese managers during the IPO period.  
The use of aggregate accruals models to detect earnings management has been 
criticized by a number of authors. Beneish (1997) finds that extreme financial 
performance limits their usefulness in contexts such as security offerings and financial 
distress. McNichols (2000) argues that when they do not consider long-term earnings 
growth there is the potential for misspecification, which can result in misleading 
inferences about earnings management behavior. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) also argue 
that aggregate accruals models do not typically control for endogenous changes to 
working capital around IPO and hence are generally unreliable.  
A few studies examine specific accruals or direct transactions in an attempt to 
detect earnings management during the pre-IPO period. Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) 
find that firms issuing equity appear to prefer managing earnings upward by selecting 
some special accruals to accelerate revenue recognition. Beaver et al. (2000), examining 
the reserves for policy claim losses in the property-casualty insurance industry, do not find 
evidence of opportunistic earnings manipulation prior to equity offerings. Darrough and 
Rangan (2005) show that managers are more likely to under-invest in R&D in order to 
increase current reported earnings during the pre-IPO period.  
The possible incentives for earnings management during the IPO process center on 
the higher issuing price of equity. Examining a sample of US IPOs, Aharony et al. (1993) 
                                                 
7 However, using UK IPOs, Ball and Shivakumar (2008) find that prospectus financial numbers do not reflect systematic 
earnings inflation and appear conservative. 
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suggest that the presumed goal of overstating reported earnings prior to the IPO “is to 
induce outside investors to pay a higher (offer) price for the firm’s common shares than is 
justified by its true profitability…such manipulation may be motivated by the 
entrepreneur’s desire to increase (his or her) wealth by increasing the value of shares 
retained and cash receipts from the (partial) disposition of existing shares” (p. 65). Other 
studies (e.g., Friedlan, 1994; Teoh et al., 1998; Darrough and Rangan, 2005) present 
similar arguments to explain managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings during the IPO 
process.  
Aharony et al. (2000) conjecture that though Chinese SOE managers may not have 
the same incentives to manage earnings as their US counterparts insofar as essentially 
they own no shares of the firm and have no stock options, they may nevertheless have 
indirect incentives to manage earnings upwards to increase the possibility of the firm 
being selected for listing. The reason for this, as already noted, is the higher prestige and 
other nonpecuniary benefits that may ensue from such activities.  
Our study adds to a growing literature that examines earnings management around 
IPOs by studying, in a Chinese corporate setting, the use of RPTs as an earning 
management tool in the pre-IPO period, and as a motivation for opportunistic tunneling 
behavior in the post-IPO period. Specifically, we conjecture that during the pre-IPO 
period, RP sales by IPO firms to their parent companies are used to boost their earnings in 
a manner that artificially affects their return on assets (ROA), consistent with the earnings 
management behavior found in Aharony et al. (2000).  
We also conjecture that a motivation for such opportunistic behavior by Chinese 
parent companies is to exploit the minority shareholders (those who bought in at IPO) by 
not repaying back debts (in the form of RP corporate loans) to the newly formed IPO 
firms in the post-IPO period. This implies a link between abnormal RP sales to manipulate 
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the earnings of the newly issued firms in the pre-IPO period, and the motivation for this 
opportunistic behavior – tunneling economic resources via non-repaid RP corporate 
loans8 in the post-IPO period. Formally stated, we test the following two hypotheses (in 
alternative form):  
 
H1: Chinese parent companies engage in opportunistic RP sales of goods and services 
to manipulate their candidate IPO firms’ earnings upwards in the period prior to 
listing.  
H2: The magnitude of abnormal RP sales of goods and services between the parent 
company and its candidate IPO firm aimed at boosting its earnings in the pre-IPO 
period is positively associated with the magnitude of economic resources tunneled 
via non-repaid RP corporate loans in the post-IPO period. 
 
Earnings management during the pre-IPO period and tunneling in the post-IPO 
period may be costly to investors in the newly formed IPO firms if the capital market fails 
to “see through” such opportunistic behavior on the part of the parent firm. Prior research 
(Teoh et al., 1998) provides evidence that newly issued US-based firms with unusually 
high accruals in the IPO year (a presumably opportunistic earnings management behavior) 
experience stock return underperformance in the subsequent three years. We extend this 
market reaction analysis, examining whether the market can “see through” a relationship 
between earnings management via increase in RP sales in the pre-IPO period and 
tunneling via increase in RP non-repaid corporate loans in the post-IPO period. Formally 
stated, we test the following hypothesis (in alternative form): 
 
                                                 
8 Liu and Lu (2007) show tunneling as more of an incentive for earnings management for Chinese listed firms with 
rights issues than for firms during the IPO period. 
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H3: The IPO firm’s stock performance in the post-IPO period is negatively correlated 
with abnormal RP sales in the pre-IPO period, which are positively associated with 
non-repaid RP corporate loans in the post-IPO period.  
 
4. Data and Univariate Analysis 
Our sample consists of 185 newly listed Chinese IPO firms that made a first-time 
issue of common shares to the public on the Shanghai Stock Exchange during the period 
1999 to 2001.9 The sample consists of firms which have at least one type of RPTs with 
their controlling parent companies during the sample period.10 For each IPO firm, data on 
RPTs are collected manually from IPO prospectuses and annual reports. To test our 
hypotheses on the entire sample of 185 IPO firms, we restrict the analysis to the three 
fiscal years starting from one year prior to the IPO year up to one post-IPO year.11 Other 
accounting and financial information is obtained from the China Stock Market & 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database.12
Table 1 presents the sample composition for each year from 1999 to 2001, 
classified by nine major industries (two-digit SIC code). The industry classification is 
based on Campbell (1996).13 As there are only a small number of firms in the Petroleum 
industries (SIC code 13, 29), we combine them with the Basic industries. The sample 
excludes the Utility industries (SIC code 46, 48, 49) and the Financial Services industries 
(SIC code 60-69). As Table 1 shows, three industry groups, the Basic industries, the 
                                                 
9 Chinese listed firms may issue common shares to either domestic investors (A shares) or to foreign investors (B 
shares) or both. During our sample period, there were no new issues of B shares.  
10 From an entire population of 208 Chinese IPOs during the sample period, we exclude a total of 23, seven that are 
from the utility and financial services industries, three that issued earlier common shares to foreigners and 13 that had 
no RPTs with their controlling parent companies during the sample period. 
11 For most of the sample firms, no RPT data are available for earlier than one year prior to the IPO year. This constraint 
prevents us from expanding the time horizon to capture potential earnings management in years -2 and -3 prior to the 
IPO year. 
12 The CSMAR is a leading data vendor which provides both financial accounting data and stock prices for all listed 
companies in China. It also provides other databases such as corporate governance and merger & acquisition databases. 
The CSMAR database may be obtained from the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). 
13 The industry classification was first obtained from the CSRC. We then reclassified the industries into nine categories 
based on Campbell (1996). 
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Consumer Durables industries and the Capital Goods industries, have a higher proportion 
of IPOs during the sample period (from 14.6% to 22.7%) than the remaining industry 
categories (from 3.2% to 11.4%). 
 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
Table 2 reports summary measures of various accounting and financial firm 
characteristics in the IPO year, for the 185 sample Chinese firms that issued shares to the 
public from 1999 to 2001. These measures are total assets, net sales, net income, cash 
flows from operating activities, financial leverage, and total proceeds from the IPOs.14  
Median values of these measures are of magnitudes similar to those reported by Aharony 
et al. (2000, Table 4) for Chinese IPOs of B shares in earlier years (1992-1995). 
 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
Panel A of Table 3 provides summary statistics of the various types of RPTs made 
solely between our sample IPO firms and their parent companies and disclosed during the 
sample period.15 Panel B shows summary statistics of selected year-end balance sheet 
items due solely to RPTs for our sample IPO firms. For each item, the average for the 
entire sample of 185 IPO firms is presented for the IPO year (t=0) as well as for one year 
prior to (t=-1) and one year following (t=+1) the IPO year. We calculate average values in 
millions of Chinese RMB (shown in the first line) as well as average ratios of RMB values 
                                                 
14 Similar data for the corresponding parent companies are not publicly available. 
15 For comparative purposes, we also present in Panel A summary statistics of sales of goods and services by IPO firms 
to non-related parties. 
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to total assets as of year-end t (shown in parentheses in the second line).16 For each type 
of RPTs, the number of IPO firms that report non-zero values is presented (in square 
brackets) in the third line. The last two columns report the simple mean changes in the 
ratios between year -1 and year 0 (diff0), and between year 0 and year +1 (diff1). Bold 
figures denote mean changes significantly different from zero (at the 5% level or better). 
For each type of RPT, the change in the ratio between two adjacent years is our measure 
of the magnitude of abnormal RPTs. As demonstrated by Aharony et al. (1993, p. 68), this 
approach corrects for the bias that may be caused by growth in a particular RPT that is 
proportional to the growth in assets. 
 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
 
 We focus on the three RPT items that are the key variables in the empirical 
analysis: (1) sales of goods and services by IPO firms to their parent companies; (2) 
purchases of goods and services by IPO firms from their parent companies; (3) IPO firms’ 
year-end balances of other receivables and other payables solely due to transactions with 
their parent companies. All outstanding corporate loans between IPO firms and their 
parent companies are recorded under “other receivables” and “other payables”. Thus, 
other receivables net of other payables represent the amount of outstanding net corporate 
loans provided by IPO firms to their parent companies.17 The statistics of the remaining 
RP items shown in Table 3 are for information only, as is the list of RPTs presented in 
Exhibit 1. 
 
                                                 
16 For each item we also calculate the ratio of the total value of RPTs across all sample IPO firms divided by the year-
end total assets across all sample IPO firms. This measures the weighted average percentage RPTs of total assets. The 
patterns are similar to those presented in Table 3. 
17 Jiang et al. (2008) also use net other receivables to proxy for corporate loans.  
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Univariate Analysis of Earnings Management Variables 
As shown in Panel A of Table 3, the mean value of total sales of goods and 
services (RP sales) by IPO firms to their parent companies increased from 220.26 million 
RMB in year -1 to 243.85 in year 0, and then declined to 204.35 million RMB in year +1. 
The mean ratio of RP sales scaled by total assets increased slightly from 7.40% in year -1 
to 7.86% in year 0, and then declined sharply to 5.49% in year +1. The mean change in 
this ratio between year 0 and year +1 (diff1) is -2.37%, significantly different from zero 
(at the 5% level or better). The frequency of IPO firms engaging in this type of RPTs 
(measured as a percentage of our entire sample of 185 IPO firms) is 58% in year -1, 66% 
in year 0 and 63% in year +1.18 There are at least two reasons to explain the higher sales 
before IPO. One is earnings manipulation, i.e., managers tend to overstate earnings before 
the IPO to boost cash proceeds from the IPO. Another is timing, i.e., managers ensure that 
the IPO is offered when earnings from normal operations are unusually high regardless of 
earnings manipulation. The pattern of non-RP sales reported in Panel A of Table 3 does 
not support the timing explanation; rather, it is more consistent with the pattern of RP 
sales. The mean ratio of non-RP sales scaled by total assets increased slightly from 
68.63% in year -1 to 69.14% in year 0, and then declined to 66.36% in year +1. The mean 
change in this ratio between year -1 and year 0 (diff0) is -0.46% and between year 0 and 
year +1 (diff1) it is -2.78%; none of these changes are statistically significant. 
In contrast, the pattern of the mean value of total purchases of goods and services 
(RP purchases) by IPO firms from their parent companies increased monotonically from 
171.27 million RMB in year -1 to 246.43 in year 0 and to 284.36 million RMB in year +1. 
The mean ratio of RP purchases scaled by total assets increased slightly from 8.26% in 
                                                 
18 Of those IPO firms that report non-zero sales of goods and services to their parent companies, the mean values and the 
mean ratios (not tabulated) are considerably larger in magnitude but closely similar in pattern to those based on the 
entire sample. For example, the mean ratio of RP sales scaled by total assets decreased sharply from 13.61% in year -1 
to 8.67% in year +1. The mean change in this ratio between year 0 and year +1 (diff1) is -4.13%, significantly different 
from zero (at the 5% level or better). 
 16
year -1 to 9.25% in year 0, and then increased sharply to 15.90% in year +1. The mean 
change in this ratio between year 0 and year +1 (diff1) is +6.65%, significantly different 
from zero (at the 5% level or better). The frequency of IPO firms engaging in this type of 
RPTs (measured as a percentage of our entire sample of 185 IPO firms) is about 71% in 
each year.19
To inflate earnings via RPTs in the pre-IPO period, related parties may collude to 
temporarily increase RP sales to the IPO firm and/or lower its cost of goods sold (COGS).  
However, while an increase in RP sales has a full impact on earnings, the effect of RP 
purchases on COGS may be only partial, depending on the inventory cost flow 
assumptions20 and the inventory systems chosen by the to-be-listed firm, as well as the 
purchase price pattern. Nevertheless, in the empirical analysis we examine whether RP 
sales and RP purchases are used in the pre-IPO period as earnings management tools.  
While we hypothesize that RP sales and purchases are used opportunistically to 
manage earnings, an alternative view may be that RPTs rationally fulfill other economic 
demands. For instance, in underdeveloped markets RPTs could be an efficient choice that 
minimizes transaction costs. Especially in a firm recently separated from a parent, RPTs 
could be part of the firm’s normal business. If so, we should observe a relatively stable 
ratio between RP and non-RP sales by IPO firms surrounding the IPO year.  
To examine this contention, for each of the 185 sample IPO firms we calculate the 
ratio between RP sales to parent companies and total sales (RPs and non-RPs). The mean 
values of these ratios (not tabulated) are 9.61% in year -1, 9.15% in year 0 and 7.73% in 
year +1 relative to the IPO year. A t-test between each pair of means indicates that the 
                                                 
19 Of those IPO firms that report non-zero purchases of goods and services from their parent companies, the mean values 
and the mean ratios (not tabulated) are considerably larger in magnitude but closely similar in pattern to those based on 
the entire sample. For example, the mean ratio of RP purchases scaled by total assets increased sharply from 13.04% in 
year -1 to 22.28% in year +1. The mean change in this ratio between year 0 and year +1 (diff1) is 9.12%, significantly 
different from zero (at the 5% level or better). 
20 China’s GAAP allow the FIFO or Weighted Average inventory valuation methods but not LIFO. 
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differences are statistically significant at the 5% level. The dramatic monotonic drop 
between year -1 and +1 in the proportion of RP sales to total sales may indicate that RP 
sales are used opportunistically to manage earnings upwards in the pre-IPO period. We 
also calculate for each of the 185 sample IPO firms the ratio between RP sales to parent 
companies and RP purchases from parent companies.21 The mean of these ratios (not 
tabulated) are 1.19 in year -1, 0.98 in year 0 and 0.75 in year +1 relative to the IPO year. 
A t-test between each pair of means indicates that the differences are statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  
This evidence may suggest that during the pre-IPO period the large ratio of RP 
sales to RP purchases induces higher profits. In contrast, in the post-IPO year the smaller 
ratio of RP sales to RP purchases induce a reversal of earnings from the temporarily high 
managed level during the pre-IPO period.  
 
Univariate Analysis of Tunneling Variables 
 Turning to Panel B of Table 3, the mean value of the sample IPO firms’ year-end 
balance of other receivables solely due to transactions with their parent companies (which 
practically consists of outstanding corporate loans to parent companies) increased from 
27.72 million RMB in years -1 to 53.28 in year 0 and to 77.20 million RMB in year +1. 
The mean ratio of year-end balance of other receivables scaled by total assets increased 
from 1.61% in year -1 to 2.73% in year 0 and to 3.22% in year +1. The mean change in 
this ratio between year -1 and year 0 (diff0) is 1.12%, and between year 0 and year +1 
(diff1) it is 0.49%, both significantly different from zero (at the 5% level or better).  
The frequency of IPO firms with non-zero year-end balances of other receivables 
(measured as a percentage of our entire sample of 185 IPO firms) is between 65% in year 
                                                 
21 Non-RP purchases of goods and services do not appear in the IPO firms’ financial statements.  
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-1 and 66.5% in years 0 and +1.22 In contrast, the mean ratio of year-end balance of other 
payables (which practically consists of outstanding corporate loans from parent 
companies) scaled by total assets decreased from 1.17% in year -1 to 0.92% in year 0, and 
further declined to 0.57% in year +1. The mean change in this ratio between year -1 and 
year 0 (diff0) is -0.25%, and between year 0 and year +1 (diff1) it is -0.35%, neither 
significantly different from zero.  
The pattern of the mean values or ratios of the net differences between year-end 
balances of other receivables and other payables is even more pronounced, showing a 
significant increase in the net outstanding corporate loans provided by IPO firms to their 
parent companies in the post-IPO period. The mean net difference increased from 9.47 
million RMB in year -1 to 60.83 in year +1 and the mean ratio of net differences increased 
from 0.84% in year -1 to 3.03% in year +1. The mean change in this ratio between year -1 
and year 0 (diff0) is 1.16%, and between year 0 and year +1 (diff1) it is 0.73%, both 
significantly different from zero (at the 5% level or better).  
Even more striking is the pattern of the ratio of the amount of corporate loan to 
parent companies (other receivables) to the amount of corporate loan from parent 
companies (other payables). The mean values of these ratios (not tabulated) are 1.50 in 
year -1, 2.35 in year 0 and 4.93 in year +1 relative to the IPO year. A t-test between means 
indicates that the differences are statistically significant at the 5% level. This pattern 
indicates a dramatic increase in the net outstanding corporate loans of IPO firms to their 
parent companies. 
Recent studies of corporate behavior in China (e.g., Jiang et al. 2008) show that 
large controlling shareholders routinely use generous corporate loans to divert funds from 
                                                 
22 Of those IPO firms that report non-zero year-end balances of “other receivables” due solely to transactions with their 
parent companies, the mean values and the mean ratios (not tabulated) are considerably larger in magnitude but closely 
similar in pattern to those based on the entire sample. For example, the mean ratio of year-end balance of “other 
receivables” scaled by total assets increased sharply from 3.15% in year -1 to 6.22% in year +1. The mean change in this 
ratio between year 0 and year +1 (diff1) is 1.32%, significantly different from zero (at the 5% level or better). 
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listed firms. The evidence presented in these studies is consistent with the assertion of 
tunneling behavior. Unlike credit sales, which are commonly reported as accounts 
receivable, these corporate loans are typically reported as other receivables on the balance 
sheets of these listed firms. Whether or not corporate lending expropriates minority 
shareholders will depend on the credit terms accorded to the parent company and whether 
the parent company repay the corporate loans. If the credit terms are consistent with 
market practice and the parent company does repay the loans, the corporate lending might 
not harm minority shareholders, and thus not represent tunneling. Hard anecdotal 
evidence, however, provides good reason to believe that in China the change in the newly 
listed firm’s ratio of net other receivables to total assets due solely to RPTs with the parent 
company is a major tunneling tool that may be used as a proxy for tunneling.23  
Anecdotal evidence indicates that parent companies frequently do not pay their 
debts to their listed companies and that this is a major reason for the untimely demise of 
many newly listed firms. The following quote from Tan (2004) illustrates this 
phenomenon: “Among the listed companies that have recorded two consecutive years of 
losses, 70 percent suffer from misappropriation by controlling shareholders, which is also 
a major reason for the operational failure of the 15 delisted companies.” According to a 
survey conducted in 2003 by the leading Chinese newspaper, China Securities Journal, 
fund misappropriation by controlling shareholders is the reason for a large amount of their 
outstanding debt (such as IPO firms’ other receivables and advance payments). The 
survey reports that a total of 57.5 billion RMB was misappropriated by controlling 
shareholders and other related parties in 2003. 
In addition, until 2005 there was no law in China to punish fund misappropriation. 
In 2003, an individual shareholder of Sanjiu Medical & Pharmaceutical Co Ltd sued its 
                                                 
23 More direct evidence of tunneling would be non-repayment of outstanding corporate loans. Unfortunately, such data 
are not available. As a proxy we use the change in net other receivables. 
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chairman because of fund misappropriation, but the case was rejected in court because 
there was no law to support the appeal. In 2004, when an individual shareholder sued 
Lianhua Monosodium Glutamate Co Ltd and its parent company, the court accepted the 
appeal but the defendant declined to appear in court on the excuse that fund 
misappropriation is very common among Chinese listed companies. 
 The severity of the phenomenon of Chinese parent companies not repaying their 
debts to their newly listed subsidiaries, and the consequent untimely demise of many 
newly listed firms, eventually led the CSRC to take regulatory actions. Since 2003, the 
CSRC has promulgated a series of regulations and rules to proscribe RP corporate loans 
and induce payment by parent companies for loans already made. These regulations are 
summarized in Table 4 in chronological order and are indicative of the CSRC’s concern 
about the magnitude of this phenomenon and its impact on the ability of the listed 
subsidiaries to survive. Furthermore, since 2005, the CSRC has required the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges to investigate and publish their listed firms’ receivables from 
their respective parent companies and other related parties, as a way to induce payment by 
parent companies.  
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
Finally, Jiang et al. (2008) provide some auditors’ reports with opinions qualified 
because of fund misappropriation by controlling shareholders. For example, in the audit 
report of Shenzhen Heguang Corporation’s 2004 annual report we read as follows: “the 
controlling shareholder and its related parties are using a large amount of funds of 
Heguang in 2004. As of December 31, 2004, the controlling shareholder and its related 
parties owe Heguang RMB 597,633,000, 432% of Heguang’s shareholders’ equity. We 
cannot make a professional judgment on the probability of collecting from the controlling 
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shareholder and its related parties due to lack of evidence of doing so.” All this evidence 
suggests that corporate loans between related parties are an indicator of tunneling by 
parent companies. 
 
5. Methodology and Analysis 
Assessing Earning Management during the IPO Process 
Aharony et al. (2000) use earnings performance, measured as return on assets 
(ROA),24 surrounding the IPO year to document evidence of earnings management in 
Chinese IPOs. Here, we examine whether RPTs are associated with the patterns of 
Chinese IPOs’ ROA in a fashion that indicates earnings management, consistent with the 
results documented by Aharony et al. (2000). Such evidence would provide support to our 
first hypothesis (H1) that Chinese parent companies engage in opportunistic RP sales to 
manipulate their candidate IPO firms’ earnings upwards in the period prior to listing. 
First, we assess the prevalence of earnings management among our Chinese IPO 
firms by replicating the methodology of Aharony et al. (2000) – estimating the pattern of 
changes in ROA surrounding the IPO year. Second, to test our first hypothesis (H1), we 
use a multiple regression model that examines whether a positive association exists 
between the to-be-listed firms’ ROA in the IPO year (year 0) and changes (between year -
1 and year 0) in their RP sales (our measure of abnormal RP sales) to their parent 
companies. By introducing changes (between year -1 and year 0) in RP purchases (our 
measure of abnormal RP purchases) into the regression model we also examine whether 
RP purchases are used to inflate earnings.  
Table 5 presents both the sample mean and median ROA and the mean and median 
differences in ROA between the IPO year (year 0) and the two adjacent years (-1 and +1). 
                                                 
24 ROA is net income in year t divided by total assets, excluding total cash, at the end of year t. Total cash is excluded to 
remove the cash effect of the IPO. 
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The results closely resemble those reported by Aharony et al. (2000), i.e., both mean and 
median ROA peak in the IPO year for the entire IPO sample. In the post-IPO year, the 
mean and median differences in ROA are both negative (-1.74 and -1.28, respectively) 
and highly statistically significant, as indicated by the t-test and Wilcoxon rank sum test 
(z-statistic), respectively, whereas in the pre-IPO year we detect positive, though 
statistically insignificant, mean and median differences in ROA (0.44 and 0.49, 
respectively).  
 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 
The following ordinary least square (OLS) regression run on our entire sample of 
185 to-be-listed IPO firms tested our first hypothesis (H1): 
 
ROAi,t=0  = a0 + a1∆RPSALESi,t=0 + a2∆RPPURi,t=0 + a3∆NRPSALESi,t=0 + a4 RPSALESi,t=0  
                      +   a5 NRPSALESi,t=0 +a6 RPPURi,t=0 +a7 DEBTi,t=0   +a8 SIZEi,t=0 + ei,t                    (1) 
 
 
Here, ROAi,t=0 is IPO firm i’s return on assets in the IPO year (t=0), calculated as 
net income in year 0 divided by total assets excluding total cash at the end of year 0.  
∆RPSALESi,t=0  is IPO firm i’s change in the ratio of RP sales to year-end total 
assets between years t=-1 and t=0, our measure of abnormal RP sales during the IPO 
process.  
∆RPPURi,t=0  is IPO firm i’s change in the ratio of RP purchases to year-end total 
assets between years t=-1 and t=0, our measure of abnormal RP purchases during the IPO 
process.  
The rest of the explanatory variables serve as controls.  
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As non-related party (NRP) sales of goods and services (NRP sales) may also be 
used to inflate earnings, we include ∆NRPSALESi,t=0, IPO firm i’s change in the ratio of 
NRP sales to year-end total assets, between years t=-1 and t=0.  
We also include the levels of the above three change variables to control for any 
effect of the level of sales or purchases on the ROA patterns. RPSALESi,t=0 is IPO firm i’s 
level of RP sales in year t=0 scaled by year-end total assets, NRPSALESi,t=0  is IPO firm 
i’s level of non-RP sales in year t=0 scaled by year-end total assets, RPPURi,t=0  is IPO 
firm i’s level of RP purchases in year t=0 scaled by year-end total assets.  
Finally, we include DEBT and SIZE to control for cross-sectional differences 
among our sample firms in financial leverage and size, respectively. Greater financial 
leverage may monitor managers and reduce agency costs, and hence increase firm 
performance (see Myers 2001 for a review). DEBTi,t=0 is IPO firm i’s long-term debt 
divided by total assets as of year-end t=0. Larger firms could be less efficient because of 
weaker control by top managers over strategic and operational activities within the firm 
(Williamson 1967). In addition, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) suggest that firm size may 
also proxy for political cost because larger firms may get more attention from the 
government. SIZEi,t=0  is IPO firm i’s natural logarithm of the market value of equity at 
year-end t=0. 
The regression results, reported in Table 6, reveal that the estimated coefficient of 
∆RPSALESi,t=0 is positive and significant (at the 5% level), indicating that abnormal RP 
sales by IPO firms to their parent companies during the pre-IPO period are positively 
associated with earnings performance, measured as return on assets (ROA), in the IPO 
year.25 We interpret these results as supportive of the contention that Chinese parent 
companies engage in opportunistic RP sales to manipulate their candidate IPO firms’ 
                                                 
25 We winsorize all continuous variables at 1% and 99% tails in an attempt to control some extreme values. This method 
is applied to all regression models reported in the paper. When we controlled for extreme values at the 1.5% and 98.5% 
tails, the results (untabulated) and conclusions derived remained unchanged. 
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earnings upwards during the IPO process in a fashion that indicates earnings management, 
consistent with the results documented by Aharony et al. (2000). In contrast, the estimated 
coefficient of ∆NRPSALESi,t=0  is small and statistically insignificant. The lack of a 
significant association between earnings performance in the IPO year and changes in NRP 
sales in the pre-IPO year suggests that managers may not use the discretion they have in 
utilizing revenue from NRP sales as an earnings management tool during the IPO process.  
The estimated coefficient of ∆RPPURi,t=0 , though negative as hypothesized, is 
small (in absolute terms) and statistically insignificant, indicating that abnormal RP 
purchases by IPO firms from their parent companies during the pre-IPO are immaterial 
means of opportunistic earnings management during the IPO process.  
The level of RP sales in the IPO year (RPSALESi,t=0) is positively related to 
contemporaneous ROA0 (with coefficient estimates statistically significant at the 1% 
level). These results are obtained after controlling for NRPSALESi,t=0, the 
contemporaneous level of NRP sales in year t=0 (which has a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient estimate at the 5% level).  
The estimated coefficient of RPPURi,t=0, the contemporaneous level of RP 
purchases in year t=0 is negative but statistically insignificant.  
Finally, the estimated coefficients for the remaining two control variables, DEBT 
and SIZE, are positive but only the former is statistically significant (at the 1% level). The 
adjusted R2 is 12.7%.   
To sum up, the results reported in Tables 5 and 6 provide support to our first 
hypothesis (H1) that Chinese parent companies engage in opportunistic RP sales to 
manipulate their candidate IPO firms’ earnings upwards in the period prior to listing. 
 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
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 Tunneling as an Incentive for Earnings Management during the IPO Process 
 Having shown that related party sales during the IPO process are used as earnings 
management tools, we now examine the incentives for such opportunistic behavior. We 
conjecture that Chinese SOE managers may be motivated to inflate the issuance price at 
IPO in order to raise more funds from the new minority shareholders than would be 
justified by the fair value of the newly listed firm, for disposal by the parent SOE. We first 
examine this assertion by analyzing the association between abnormal RP sales and 
purchases and the proceeds obtained by the IPO. Second, we extend the exploitation of the 
minority shareholders argument, conjecturing that inflating earnings in the pre-IPO period 
is motivated by the opportunity for tunneling behavior in the post-IPO period. For this 
purpose we analyze the association between abnormal RP sales and purchases in the pre-
IPO period and tunneling behavior in the form of parent companies failing to repay 
outstanding net corporate debt to their newly listed subsidiary firms, in the post-IPO 
period. 
Kim and Ritter (1999) report that the price-earnings (PE) multiple method is the 
most common means of valuating IPOs. The higher the PE ratio for a given level of 
earnings, the larger the proceeds of the newly listed firm in the initial public offering.  In 
using this model to examine the association between abnormal RP sales and purchases 
and the magnitude of the proceeds raised in the IPO, we run the following OLS 
regression, in the spirit of Kim and Ritter (1999), for our entire sample of 185 IPO firms: 
 
PEi,t=0 = b0 + b1 ∆RPSALESi,t=0 + b2 ∆RPPURi,t=0 + b3 ∆NRPSALESi,t=0,+ b4 RPSALESi,t=0
                  + b5 NRPSALESi,t=0 + b6 RPPURi,t=0  + b7 PECi,t=0+ ei,t                                             (2) 
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Here, PEi,t=0 is IPO firm i’s offering price per share divided by its earnings per 
share in the IPO year (t=0), ∆RPSALESi,t=0 , ∆RPPURi,t=0  , ∆NRPSALESi,t=0, RPSALESi,t=0 
, NRPSALESi,t=0  and RPPURi,t=0  are as defined in equation (1), and PECi,t=0  is the median 
PE ratio of all firms in the same industry as IPO firm i that went public during the 12 
months prior to firm i’s IPO year (t=0), controlling for industry peers’ PE ratios.  
The regression results, reported in Table 7, indicate that the estimated coefficients 
of both the change (∆RPSALES) and level (RPSALES) of RP sales are positive and 
significant (at the 10% and 5% level, respectively). We interpret this positive association 
with the initial PE ratio as an indication that inflating sales by RP transactions increases 
the IPO initial valuation, resulting in higher proceeds from minority investors.26 The 
negative estimated coefficients of ∆RPPURi,t=0, and RPPURi,t=0 are also consistent with 
these conclusions though they are statistically insignificant. These results are obtained 
after controlling for NRP sales and for industry peers’ PE ratios. 
 
(Insert Table 7 here) 
 
To assess the prevalence of tunneling in the post-IPO period, we use IPO firm i’s 
change in the ratio of net outstanding corporate loans (reported as IPO firms’ other 
receivables net of other payables) to year-end total assets, between year t=0 and year 
t=+1, due solely to RPTs with parent companies (denoted by ∆NORECi,t=1). In particular, 
we examine whether our measure of tunneling is positively associated with our measure 
of earnings management (abnormal RP sales) during the pre-IPO period (t=-1 to t=0), 
denoted by ∆RPSALESi,t=0. We examine the possibility of such an association first by 
conducting a univariate analysis and then via a multivariate regression analysis. 
                                                 
26 The correlation coefficient between ∆RPSALES in year 0 and gross proceeds from IPO is 0.246 (p=0.017), indicating 
that earnings management through related party sales of goods and services results in more funds being raised from 
minority shareholders. 
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 Table 8 presents summary statistics of the occurrence of an association between 
earnings management behavior via abnormal RP sales in the pre-IPO period and tunneling 
via abnormal net outstanding corporate loans to parent companies in the post-IPO period 
in our sample of 185 Chinese IPO firms.  
In 124 cases (67% of our sample) there is a positive association between our 
earnings management and tunneling measures. Of these, for 96 cases both ∆RPSALESi,t=0  
and ∆NORECi,t=1 are positive (i.e., both earnings management and tunneling prevail) with 
a mean increase in RP sales in the pre-IPO period of 1.89%, and a mean increase in net 
outstanding corporate loans in the post-IPO period of 4.88%. For the remaining 28 cases 
both ∆RPSALESi,t=0  and ∆NORECi,t=1 are negative (i.e., no earnings management and no 
tunneling) with a mean decrease in RP sales in the pre-IPO period of 1.92% and a mean 
decrease in net outstanding corporate loans in the post-IPO period of 2.16%.  
As shown in the table, it is possible to have earnings management without any 
apparent tunneling: in 20 cases there is an increase in RP sales in the pre-IPO period 
(∆RPSALESi,t=0 > 0) (mean increase 2.26%) followed by a decrease in net outstanding 
corporate loans in the post-IPO period (∆NORECi,t=1<=0) (mean decrease 3.27%).  
Finally, it is possible to have tunneling without earnings management: in 41 cases 
there is a decrease in RP sales in the pre-IPO period (∆RPSALESi,t=0 <=0) (mean decrease 
5.72%) followed by an increase in net outstanding corporate loans in the post-IPO period 
(∆NORECi,t=1>0) (mean increase 2.62%).  
To test whether the occurrence of tunneling (the columns) is independent of the 
occurrence of earnings management (the rows), we use a Chi-square test. As shown in 
Table 8, we obtain a Chi-square of 15.96 (statistically significant at the 1% level or less), 
rejecting the null hypothesis that our earnings management and tunneling proxy variables 
are independent. The lack of independence supports our assertion of an association 
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between tunneling via increase in net non-repaid corporate loans in the post-IPO period 
and earnings management via increase in RP sales in the pre-IPO period. 
 
(Insert Table 8 here) 
 
Next, we examine for the possibility of our predicted association using the 
following OLS regression for our entire sample of 185 IPO firms: 
 
∆NORECi,t=1 =d0 + d1 ∆RPSALESi,t=0+ d2 ∆RPPURi,t=0 + d3 ∆NRPSALESi,t=0 +d4 ∆RPSALESi,t=1 
                                           + d5 ∆RPPURi,t=1 +d6 ∆NRPSALESi,t=1 + d7 CFOi,t=1  +d8 ∆CFOi,t=1 
                            + d9 DEBTi,t=1   +d10 ∆DEBTi,t=1   + d11 MBEi,t=1+d12 SIZEi,t=1+ ei,t                               (3)                                
 
 
Here, ∆NORECi,t=1, ∆RPSALESi,t=0, ∆RPPURi,t=0, ∆NRPSALESi,t=0,  are as defined 
earlier. We also include measures of the latter three variables for the post-IPO year, i.e., 
between year t=0 and year t=+1: ∆RPSALESi,t=1, ∆RPPURi,t=1 and ∆NRPSALESi,t=1. We do 
so to account for the possibility that the amount of tunneling in the post-IPO period is 
related not only to the magnitude of earnings management through RP sales and purchases 
in the pre-IPO period; it is plausible that listed firms tunnel resources back to the parent 
company and mask their performance through RPTs in the concurrent period too. The rest 
of the explanatory variables serve as controls.  
CFOi,t=1 is IPO firm i’s cash flows from operations in year t=+1 scaled by total 
assets as of year-end t=+1. ∆CFOi,t=1  is the change in CFO between years t=0 and t=+1. 
DEBTi,t=1  is IPO firm i’s long-term debt as of year-end t=+1 divided by total assets as of 
year-end t=+1. ∆DEBTi,t=1  is the change in DEBT between years t=0 and t=+1. MBEi,t=1 is 
IPO firm i’s market value of equity as of year-end t=+1 divided by IPO firm i’s book 
value of equity as of year-end t=+1. SIZEi,t=1 is the natural logarithm of IPO firm i’s 
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market value of equity as of year-end t=+1. Since NOREC is an accrual measure, we 
include CFO as an additional control variable, following previous studies (e.g., Dechow, 
1994; Kasznik, 1999) that have shown a significant negative association between CFO 
and accrual measures. DEBT, MBE, and SIZE are introduced as control variables for cross-
sectional differences in financial leverage, firms’ growth potential, and size, respectively, 
across our sample firms. Since we use change in NOREC as a dependent variable, we also 
include changes in CFO and in DEBT in the regression analysis. 
The regression results, reported in Table 9, show that the estimated coefficient of 
∆RPSALESi,t=0 is positive and significant (at the 5% level). This indicates that abnormal 
RP sales by IPO firms to their parent companies in the pre-IPO period (t=-1 to t=0) are 
positively associated with abnormal net RP corporate loans provided by IPO firms to their 
parent companies in the post-IPO period (t=0 to t=+1). The magnitude of the estimated 
regression coefficient is relatively large (0.496), indicating that this association also has 
economic significance: one RMB increase in RP sales in the pre-IPO period results in a 
0.496 RMB increase in net corporate loans to parent companies in the post-IPO period.  
We interpret these results as supportive of the contention that Chinese parent 
companies engage in opportunistic RP sales to boost their candidate IPO firms’ earnings 
in the pre-IPO period and then tunnel economic resources away from their new affiliates 
via abnormal RP corporate loans in the post-IPO period.27 The estimated coefficient of 
∆RPPURi,t=0 is small and statistically insignificant, indicating immaterial means of 
opportunistic behavior via RP purchases in the pre-IPO period. The estimated coefficient 
of ∆NRPSALESi,t=0 is also small and statistically insignificant. Nor do we find any 
significant concurrent association between the tunneling measure (∆NORECi,t=1) and the 
                                                 
27 In an earlier version of this paper, we tested whether IPO firms endowed with supposedly sound corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as the presence of independent directors and the separation of the positions of board chairperson and 
CEO, reduce their parent companies’ earnings management and tunneling behavior but found no significant impact. Our 
interpretation is that the soundness of corporate governance mechanisms among Chinese listed companies is 
questionable. 
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three main variables (∆RPSALESi,t=1, ∆RPPURi,t=1 and  ∆NRPSALESi,t=1). These results 
indicate that concurrent changes in RP and non-RP transactions have no significant 
association with the amount of resources tunneled. Taken together, the results suggest that 
only changes in RP sales in the pre-IPO period are associated with tunneling in the post-
IPO period.  
The estimated coefficients for the control variables in both regressions are 
generally statistically insignificant, except for CFO, which is negative and statistically 
significant, consistent with the mechanical relationship between cash flows and accrual 
measures reported in the literature (e.g., Dechow, 1994; Kasznik, 1999).28
 
(Insert Table 9 here) 
 
To sum up, the results reported in Tables 8 and 9 provide support to our second 
hypothesis (H2). That is, the magnitude of abnormal RP sales between the parent company 
and its candidate IPO firm aimed at boosting its earnings in the pre-IPO period is 
positively associated with the magnitude of economic resources tunneled via abnormal RP 
corporate loans from these subsidiaries in the post-IPO period.  
 
Do Investors Perceive Opportunistic RPTs? A Post-IPO Test of the Implications of 
Tunneling for Capital Markets 
 
We propose that new investors in Chinese IPO firms fail to perceive the 
relationship between opportunistic RP sales in the pre-IPO period and tunneling via 
opportunistic RP corporate loans in the post-IPO period. If this is indeed the case then the 
market valuation of IPO firms in the post-IPO period should be negatively correlated with 
                                                 
28 Specifically, ∆NOREC is subtracted from net income to calculate cash flow from operations (CFO) under the indirect 
method. Thus CFO is mechanically negatively associated with ∆NOREC.  
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abnormal RP sales in the pre-IPO period, which are positively associated with abnormal 
RP net outstanding corporate loans in the post-IPO period (H3). 
To test the hypothesis, we run the following OLS regression in the spirit of the 
regression model used in Ritter (1991, Table X), including our measure of abnormal RP 
sales in the pre-IPO period (∆RPSALESi,t=0), our measure of abnormal RP net outstanding 
corporate loans in the post-IPO period (∆NORECi,t=1) and other relevant explanatory 
variables: 
BHRi = f0 + f1 ∆RPSALESi,t=0 + f2 ∆NORECi,t=1 + f3 Dummy1+ f4 Dummy2 
                + f5 Dummy3 + f6 ∆RPPURi,t=0+ f7 ∆NRPSALESi,t=0   + f8 ∆NORECi,t=0 
                +  f9 ∆RPSALESi,t=1 +  f10 ∆RPPURi,t=1+ f11 ∆NRPSALESi,t=1 + f12 IPORETi  
                + f13 MARKETi + f14 ROAi,t=0  + f15 MBEi,t=0 + f16 SIZEi,t=0 +  ei,t                                    (4) 
 
Here, BHRi is IPO firm i’s 12-month or 24-month post-IPO buy-and-hold raw 
return starting four months after the first fiscal year-end subsequent to the IPO.29 
∆RPSALESi,t=0,  ∆NORECi,t=1, ∆RPPURi,t=0, ∆NRPSALESi,t=0, ∆NORECi,t=0, 
∆RPSALESi,t=1, ∆RPPURi,t=1, ∆NRPSALESi,t=1, ROAi,t=0, MBEi,t=0, and SIZEi,t=0 are as 
defined earlier.30  
As was shown in Table 8, in 96 cases earnings management in the pre-IPO period 
(∆RPSALESi,t=0>0) was followed by tunneling in the post-IPO period (∆NORECi,t=1>0). 
Nevertheless, in 20 cases earnings management in the pre-IPO period prevailed without 
any apparent tunneling in the post-IPO period and vice versa, in 41 cases tunneling in the 
post-IPO period prevailed without any apparent earnings management in the pre-IPO 
period.  
                                                 
29 IPOs occur at various times during the year, while accounting data are for the fiscal year. Teoh et al. (1998) discuss 
this issue and provide various empirical sensitivities to the time period. We choose buy-and-hold raw returns calculated 
starting four months after the first fiscal year-end subsequent to the IPO. As robustness checks we also examine various 
alternative time periods for computing our buy-and-hold returns measure. These additional sensitivity tests yield results 
similar to those reported in the text. 
30 The key independent variables are scaled by total assets. As a sensitivity test we rerun regression (4) using year-end 
market value of equity instead as a deflator where relevant. The results (not tabulated) are qualitatively similar to those 
reported below. 
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To control for the effects of the various interactions between our measures of 
earnings management in the pre-IPO period and tunneling in the post-IPO period on the 
market valuation of IPO firms in the post-IPO period, we introduce three interaction 
dummies. Dummy1 equals one when both ∆RPSALESi,t=0 and ∆NORECi,t=1 are positive, 
and zero otherwise. Dummy2 equals one when ∆RPSALESi,t=0 is positive but ∆NORECi,t=1 
is non-positive, and zero otherwise. Dummy3 equals one when ∆RPSALESi,t=0 is non-
positive and ∆NORECi,t=1 is positive, and zero otherwise. ∆NORECi,t=0 is included to 
capture opportunistic tunneling behavior in the pre-IPO period.  
The post-IPO period (t=0 to t=+1) measures of ∆RPSALESi,t=1 and, ∆RPPURi,t=1 
are included in the regression to examine how the market perceives each of these two 
explanatory variables in the period concurrent with the hypothesized tunneling. To 
examine whether investors value the change in RP sales differently from the change in 
NRP sales, we include in the regression ∆NRPSALESi,t=0 and ∆NRPSALESi,t=1.  
Finally, we include other factors that may affect post-IPO stock performance. 
IPORETi is IPO firm i’s market-adjusted initial IPO trading day return, which is included 
to capture the impact of under-pricing on IPO firm i’s post-IPO performance. MARKETi is 
the Shanghai stock market value-weighted return for the same interval as the dependent 
variable. Its estimated coefficient captures the systematic risk, beta. ROAi,t=0 is included to 
control for accounting performance measures other than changes in RP sales or NRP 
sales, in an effort to avoid the problem of omitted variables if changes in RP sales or NRP 
sales are correlated with other accounting performance indicators. MBEi,t=0, and SIZEi,t=0 
are introduced to control for cross-sectional differences in firms’ growth potential and 
size, respectively, across our sample firms in the IPO year.  
The regression results, reported in Table 10, provide evidence of the implications 
for capital markets of opportunistic RP sales in the pre-IPO period and tunneling via RP 
 33
non-repaid net corporate loans in the post-IPO period. The estimated coefficient of 
∆RPSALESi,t=0 is significantly negative (at the 5% level) in both regressions. The 
relatively large magnitude (in absolute terms) of the estimated coefficient of 
∆RPSALESi,t=0 indicates that this association also has economic significance. For 
example, one unit increase in RP sales (relative to total assets) in the pre-IPO period may 
result in a 0.596% decrease in 24-month post-IPO stock returns.  
The estimated coefficient of ∆NORECi,t=1 in the 12-month BHR regression is 
negative but statistically insignificant, suggesting no concurrent implications of tunneling 
for the market. In contrast, the estimated coefficient of ∆NORECi,t=1 in the 24-month BHR 
regression is significantly negative (-0.853, significant at the 5% level). This indicates that 
tunneling through corporate loans in the post-IPO year results in stock underperformance 
in the subsequent year, consistent with the results reported in Jiang et al. (2008). 
Furthermore, the estimated coefficient of Dummy1, the interaction variable that 
accounts for the occurrence of earnings management followed by tunneling is also 
significantly negative (at the 5% level) in both regressions. This suggests 
underperformance of IPO firms’ 12- or 24-month post-IPO buy-and-hold raw return due 
to opportunistic RP sales in the pre-IPO year that are associated with increase in RP non-
repaid net corporate loans in the post-IPO period.  
We interpret this evidence as being consistent with our third hypothesis (H3), 
namely, new investors in Chinese IPOs fail to perceive the relationship between earnings 
management via abnormal RP sales in the pre-IPO period and tunneling via abnormal RP 
corporate loans in the post-IPO period. Nevertheless, when firms are engaged in pre-IPO 
earnings management but not in post-IPO tunneling (Dummy2=1), we report a negative 
effect on the 12-month and 24-month post-IPO buy-and-hold raw return: in both 
regressions the estimated coefficient of Dummy2 is negative, statistically significant at the 
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10% level. This suggests that pre-IPO earnings management is overlooked by investors, 
resulting in post-IPO stock underperformance31 regardless of post-IPO tunneling. Also, 
when firms engage in post-IPO tunneling with no apparent pre-IPO earnings management 
(Dummy3=1), we report a negative effect only on the 24-month post-IPO buy-and-hold 
raw return: the estimated coefficient of Dummy3 is negative, statistically significant at the 
5% level. This evidence, of no concurrent but subsequent stock underperformance, 
suggests that investors do not “see through” post-IPO tunneling through abnormal net 
corporate loans regardless of earnings management in the pre-IPO period.  
The estimated coefficient of ∆RPPURi,t=0 is statistically insignificant in the 12-
month BHR regression and marginally significant (at the 10% level) in the 24-month 
BHR regression. The estimated coefficients of ∆RPPURi,t=1 in both regressions are small 
and statistically insignificant. These results indicate no market implications of 
opportunistic RP purchases in either the pre- or post-IPO period.  
In both regressions, the estimated coefficients of ∆RPSALESi,t=1 (the post-IPO 
year) and of ∆NORECi,t=0 (the pre-IPO year) are statistically insignificant, suggesting that 
neither abnormal RP sales to parent companies in the post-IPO period nor abnormal RP 
net corporate loans to parent companies in the pre-IPO period are perceived by investors 
as opportunistic earnings management or tunneling behavior, respectively.  
In contrast to the estimated coefficient of ∆RPSALESi,t=0, the estimated coefficient 
of ∆NRPSALESi,t=0  is small and statistically insignificant, suggesting that investors 
perceive changes in RP sales differently from changes in NRP sales. Similarly, the 
estimated coefficient of the NRP sales variable in the post-IPO year (∆NRPSALESi,t=1) is 
also small and statistically insignificant in both regressions, indicating no apparent impact 
on either concurrent or subsequent stock performance. 
                                                 
31 It is consistent with the results reported by Teoh et al. (1998). 
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These results hold after controlling for the following five factors that may affect 
post-IPO stock performance: (1) the market-adjusted initial trading day return, IPORETi, 
which has a significantly negative (at the 1% level) estimated coefficient; (2) the market 
return, MARKETi, with an estimated beta of 0.940 in the 12-month regression and 1.326 in 
the 24-month regression, both statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating an 
increase in our sample firms’ market risk in the post-IPO period; (3) a summary measure 
of accounting performance, ROAi,t=0, with a positive estimated coefficient in each 
regression but statistically significant (at the 5% level) only in the 12-month regression, 
which may indicate that accounting performance in the IPO year has a positive impact on 
subsequent one-year but not two-year BHR; (4) growth potential, MBEi,t=0, with a positive 
estimated coefficient in each regression (statistically significant at the 1% level in the 12-
month regression and at the 10% level in the 24-month regression), suggesting that IPO 
firms with growth potential experience positive post-IPO stock performance; (5) IPO-
firm’s size, SIZEi,t=0, with a negative but statistically insignificant estimated coefficient in 
each regression, indicating the sample firms’ size probably has no impact on future stock 
performance. Finally, the adjusted R2 is 0.65 and 0.72, for the 12-month and the 24-month 
regressions, respectively. 
 
(Insert Table 10 here) 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
We analyze a sample of 185 newly listed Chinese IPO firms that issued common 
shares to domestic investors on the Shanghai Stock Exchange during the period 1999 to 
2001. We select China as the ground for our investigation because of its unique 
institutional setting and the availability of data on related-party transactions (RPTs). 
 36
Unlike most prior research that has examined the use of discretionary accruals to manage 
earnings, we study related party sales and purchases of goods and services as earnings 
management tools during the initial public offering (IPO) process in China. 
We provide evidence that in underdeveloped markets related party (RP) sales and 
purchases are not likely to be an efficient business choice to minimize transaction costs 
for firms recently separated from their parents. Rather, we show that RP sales in particular 
could be used opportunistically to manage earnings upwards in the pre-IPO period. We 
also add an additional facet to the motives offered in the literature for such opportunistic 
behavior. Thus, previous research suggests that Chinese managers are motivated by the 
ambition to qualify for IPO or to gain prestige and other non-pecuniary benefits or to 
inflate the issuance price at the IPO in order to raise more funds for the parent firm 
disposal.  We, however, provide evidence of the possibility that inflating earnings in the 
pre-IPO period is also motivated by the prospect of opportunities for tunneling in the post-
IPO period, i.e., exploiting economic resources from minority shareholders (those who 
bought in at IPO) for the benefit of the parent company.  
We present evidence of one such opportunistic tunneling tool: non-repayment of 
net outstanding corporate debt by Chinese parent companies to their newly listed 
subsidiaries. Furthermore, we provide evidence in support of our assertion of an 
association between tunneling via increase in net outstanding RP corporate loans in the 
post-IPO period and earnings management via abnormal RP sales in the pre-IPO period. 
Lastly, we provide evidence that the IPO firm’s stock performance in the post-IPO 
period is negatively correlated with abnormal RP sales in the pre-IPO period, which are 
positively associated with non-repayment of net outstanding RP corporate loans in the 
post-IPO period. Nevertheless, the results also provide evidence of a negative correlation 
between the IPO firm’s stock performance in the post-IPO period and either pre-IPO 
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abnormal RP sales or post-IPO non-repayment of net outstanding RP corporate loans. 
This implies that new investors in Chinese IPO firms fail to “see through” earnings 
management via abnormal RP sales in the pre-IPO period, tunneling via non-repayment of 
RP corporate loans in the post-IPO period and the relationship between the two. Thus, 
earnings management during the pre-IPO period and tunneling in the post-IPO period are 
costly to investors in the newly formed IPO firms. 
By providing empirical evidence, via RPTs, on earnings management in the pre-
IPO period and tunneling in the post-IPO period, and on the failure of IPO investors to 
perceive either of these two practices or the linkage between them, we enhance 
understanding of the motives for and consequences of earnings manipulation in the pre-
IPO period.   
As discussed in details in the Introduction, the paper has implications for the 
following issues: (1) the efficiency of the Chinese stock market, (2) the need for China 
and other emerging markets to improve the protection of minority shareholders’ rights, (3) 
an additional investment risk to foreign investors in China’s capital markets as well as in 
Chinese firms cross-listed in non-Chinese stock exchanges (through earnings management 
and resource tunneling), and (4) its novel methodology may also be applied by future 
researchers in non-Chinese studies to detect earnings management and resources tunneling  
Like most studies ours is not without its limitations. First, although we focus on 
RP sales and purchases as tools that parent company managers can plausibly use to 
manage earnings prior to IPO, other types of related party items may also serve this 
purpose. Second, although we focus on net RP corporate loans provided by IPO firms to 
their parent companies as a form of tunneling in the post-IPO period, there may be other 
ways besides credit transactions to divert resources to related parties. To substantiate our 
assertion, in addition to anecdotal evidence, we also provide data on regulatory actions 
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taken by the CSRC to proscribe RP corporate loans. However, we cannot provide more 
direct evidence, such as favorable loan terms compared to typical contemporaneous bank 
loan terms in China. Third, it is difficult to measure abnormal RP sales, purchases and 
credits. Finally, the data analyzed in this study pertain to the three-year period 1999-2001. 
Future research may determine whether our findings can be generalized to time periods 
beyond 2001 or to IPO samples drawn from other countries.  
These limitations notwithstanding, to the best of our knowledge, no previous 
research has investigated whether parent companies engage in earnings management via 
RPTs in the pre-IPO period to facilitate tunneling in the post-IPO period.32 By providing 
empirical evidence on such a link, and on the apparent failure of IPO investors to perceive 
it, we aim to enhance understanding of the motives for and consequences of earnings 
manipulation in the pre-IPO period. 
                                                 
32 Jian and Wong (2008) also examine RPTs using Chinese data, but they focus on listed companies rather than IPOs. 
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EXHIBIT 1: Types of RPTs that IPO and publicly listed firms must disclose in    
China 
 
 
Type of related party 
transactions 
Description 
1 Trade of goods Transactions that involve sales (purchases) of goods 
to (from) related parties. 
 
2 Trade of services Transactions that involve sales (purchases) of 
services to (from) related party. 
 
3 Commissions Commissions received from (paid to) related parties 
for providing (obtaining) agency services.  
 
4 Overhead reimbursement Fees received from (paid to) related parties for 
providing (obtaining) administrative services. 
 
5 Transfer of R&D Transactions that involve transfer of shared R&D 
projects to (from) related parties.  
 
6 Permits and franchises Transactions that involve provision of permits or 
franchises to (from) related parties. 
 
7 Trade of assets other than 
goods 
Transactions that involve sales (purchases) of assets 
other than goods to (from) related parties. 
Machinery and buildings are typical examples of 
other assets. 
 
8 Leases Operating or capital leases to (from) related parties. 
 
9 Loans Loans provided to (by) related parties (combining 
principal and interest revenue or expenses).  
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TABLE 1: Sample composition of Chinese IPOs by year of IPO and by industry 
 
          Year of IPO  
Industry 
Two-digit 
SIC Code 1999 2000 2001 Total Percentage 
       
Food and Tobacco 
 
 
1, 2, 9, 20, 21, 
54 
4 6 4 14 7.6% 
Basic industries 
including Petroleum 
10, 12, 13, 14, 
24, 26, 28, 29, 
33 
7 19 16 42 22.7% 
Construction 
 
 
15, 16, 17, 32, 
52 
4 3 4 11 5.9% 
Textiles and Trade 
 
 
22, 23, 31, 51, 
53, 56, 59 
2 7 4 13 7.0% 
Consumer Durables 
 
 
25, 30, 36, 37, 
39, 50, 55, 57 
9 8 10 27 14.6% 
Capital Goods 
 
 
34, 35, 38 7 15 15 37 20.0% 
Transportation 
 
 
40, 41, 42, 44, 
45, 47 
1 8 5 14 7.6% 
Services 
 
 
72, 73 75, 76, 
80, 82, 87, 89 
0 4 2 6 3.2% 
Conglomerate 
 
 
No specific 
SIC code 
7 6 8 21 11.4% 
Entire sample  41 76 68 185 100% 
 
The table shows the sample composition of 185 newly listed Chinese IPO firms on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange for each year from 1999 to 2001, classified by nine major industries (two-digit SIC code). Each 
sample firm has engaged in at least one type of RPTs during the sample period. The industry classification is 
based on Campbell (1996). As the number of firms in the Petroleum industries (SIC code 13, 29) is small, 
we combine them with the Basic industries. The sample excludes the Utility industries (SIC code 46, 48, 49) 
and the Financial Services industries (SIC 60-69). 
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TABLE 2: Financial attributes of the sample Chinese IPO firms 
 
Characteristics Median Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
   
Total assets 
(million RMB) 983.09 1,602.03 3,051.30 188.75 38,966.70
  
Net sales 
(million RMB) 399.32 931.34 2,486.69 40.15 30,940.53
  
Net income 
(million RMB) 43.26 89.95 233.63 2.24 2,992.10
  
Cash flow from operating 
activities 
(million RMB) 26.35 125.62 821.28 -630.3 8,995.33
  
Long-term debt as a 
percentage of total assets 
(%) 4.95 10.21
 
13.22 0 75.36
  
Total proceeds from IPOs 
(million RMB) 400.79 572.59 675.00 94.42 7,702.89
The table reports median and mean values of various firm characteristics in the IPO year, for the 185 
Chinese firms that issued shares to domestic investors from 1999 to 2001. These measures are total assets, 
net sales, net income, cash flow from operating activities, long-term debt ratio and total proceeds from the 
IPOs. 
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TABLE 3: Descriptive statistics of transactions solely between sample IPO firms and 
their parent companies (RPs) 
 
Year relative to IPO year (0) -1 0 1 Diff0 Diff1 
Panel A: Main types of recurring RPTs      
Sales of goods and services to RPs 220.26 a
(7.40%) b
[107] e
243.85 
(7.86%) 
[122] 
204.35 
(5.49%) 
[117] 
 
0.46% c
 
-2.37%d
      
Sales of goods and services to non-RPs 586.16 
(68.63%) 
[185] 
770.00 
(69.14%) 
[185] 
973.54 
(66.36%) 
[185] 
 
0.50% 
 
-2.78% 
      
      
Purchases of goods and services from RPs 171.27 
(8.26%) 
[131] 
246.43 
(9.25%) 
[130] 
284.36 
(15.90%) 
[132] 
 
0.99% 
 
6.65% 
      
Other revenues from RPs 0.80 
(0.13%) 
[36] 
1.14 
(0.15%) 
[27] 
1.59 
(0.17%) 
[41] 
 
0.02% 
 
0.02% 
Other expenses to RPs 1.39 
(0.09%) 
[39] 
2.29 
(0.13%) 
[31] 
2.33 
(0.15%) 
[36] 
 
0.04% 
 
0.02% 
Difference (net other expenses to RPs) 0.59 
(0.04%) 
1.15 
(0.02%) 
0.75 
(0.02%) 
 
0.02% 
 
0.00% 
      
Sales of other assets to RPs 2.56 
(0.28%) 
[38] 
1.09 
(0.08%) 
[14] 
3.63 
(0.41%) 
[17] 
 
-0.20% 
 
0.33% 
Purchases of other assets from RPs 18.13 
(0.64%) 
[40] 
36.33 
(2.03%) 
[28] 
148.73 
(1.94%) 
[47] 
 
1.39% 
 
-0.09% 
Difference (net purchases of other assets 
from RPs) 
15.57 
(0.36%) 
35.24 
(1.95%) 
145.10 
(1.52%) 
 
-1.59% 
 
0.43% 
      
Leases to RPs 0.18 
(0.06%) 
[43] 
0.20 
(0.04%) 
[20] 
0.26 
(0.03%) 
[23] 
 
-0.02% 
 
-0.01% 
Leases from RPs 1.81 
(0.11%) 
[101] 
2.42 
(0.18%) 
[98] 
21.82 
(2.62%) 
[104] 
 
0.07% 
 
2.44% 
Difference (net leases from RPs) 1.63 
(0.06%) 
2.22 
(0.14%) 
21.56 
(2.59%) 
  
-0.08% -2.45% 
Panel B:  Selected year-end  balance sheet items for IPO firms solely due to RPTs 
Year-end other receivables (including 
advance payments) 
27.72 
(1.61%) 
[120] 
53.28 
(2.73%) 
[123] 
77.20 
(3.22%) 
[123] 
 
1.12% 
 
0.49% 
Year-end other payables (including 
advance receipts) 
18.25 
(1.17%) 
[111] 
23.52 
(0.92%) 
[110] 
16.37 
(0.57%) 
[109] 
 
-0.25% 
 
-0.35% 
Difference (net other receivables) f 9.47 
(0.84%) 
29.76 
(2.30%) 
60.83 
(3.03%) 
 
1.16% 
 
0.73% 
      
Year-end accounts receivable 21.78 
(0.88%) 
[110] 
23.55 
(1.10%) 
[122] 
27.62 
(1.18%) 
[118] 
 
0.21% 
 
0.07% 
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Year-end accounts payable 9.58 
(0.60%) 
[131] 
7.84 
(0.70%) 
[130] 
12.46 
(0.65%) 
[139] 
 
0.10% 
 
-0.05% 
Difference (net accounts receivable) 12.2 
(0.58%) 
15.72 
(0.40%) 
15.16 
(0.32%) 
  
-0.18% -0.08% 
 
Panel A provides summary statistics of the various types of recurring RPTs solely between sample IPO 
firms and their parent companies disclosed during the sample period. Panel B shows summary statistics of 
selected year-end balance sheet items for the sample IPO firms solely due to RPTs. Mean values for the 
entire sample of 185 IPO firms are presented for t=0 (the IPO year), for t=-1 and for t=+1. Mean values in 
millions of Chinese RMB are shown in the first line; mean ratios (RMB values scaled by year-end total 
assets) are shown in the second line, for each type of RPT; the number of IPO firms that report non-zero 
values is presented in the third line. The description of RPTs is provided in Exhibit 1. “Other revenues” and 
“other expenses” consist of four types of RPTs: commissions, overhead reimbursement, transfer of R&D, 
and permits and franchises. The last two columns report the simple mean changes in the ratios between year 
-1 and year 0 (diff0), and between year 0 and year +1 (diff1). Bold figures denote mean changes significantly 
different from zero (at the 5% level or better). 
 
a Mean value of sales of goods and services to RPs in millions of Chinese RMB calculated across the entire 
sample of 185 IPO firms. 
b Mean ratio of sales of goods and services to total assets as of the end of year t calculated across the entire 
sample of 185 IPO firms. 
c Mean changes in the ratio between year -1 and year 0. 
d Mean changes in the ratio between year 0 and year +1. 
e The number of IPO firms that report non-zero values of sales of goods and services to RPs.  
f All outstanding corporate loans between IPO firms and their parent companies are recorded under “other 
receivables” and “other payables”. Thus, other receivables net of other payables represent the amount of net 
outstanding corporate loans provided by IPO firms to their parent companies. 
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TABLE 4: CSRC regulations and rules designed to prevent related party corporate 
loans and induce payment by parent companies (2003-2006) 
 
Date Regulation sequence Regulation content Effects of regulation 
2003.08 CSRC announcement CSRC requested all listed 
companies to limit corporate 
loans. 
 
Not very effective because 
of the lack of legal 
enforcement power. 
No. 56 
    
2005.06 CSRC announcement CSRC requested related parties 
of listed companies to repay 
outstanding loans 
 
Not very effective because 
of the lack of legal 
enforcement power. 
No. 37 
    
2005.10 State Council 
announcement No. 34 
Corporate loans between related 
parties are prohibited and they 
are required to repay 
outstanding loans by various 
means. If the related party is a 
state-owned enterprise, the 
persons in charge will be 
penalized or even dismissed if 
they cannot manage to repay 
outstanding loans or if they take 
further loans from related 
parties. 
 
The State Council has legal 
enforcement power. On the 
day the announcement was 
published, the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock indexes 
increased by 1.36% and 
1.13%, respectively. 
 
2006.05 CSRC announcement CSRC sets a timeline for related 
parties to repay existing loans 
According to the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges’ 2006 statistics, 
28% of related parties 
cannot afford to repay their 
loans; 28% will repay by 
restructuring by means such 
as injecting assets or 
cancelling shares; 12% will 
use cash to repay; the 
others will use both cash 
and restructuring methods 
to repay. 
No. 92 
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TABLE 5: Earnings performance measured as return on assets (ROA) surrounding 
the IPO year of Chinese IPO firms, 1999-2001 
 
 
 
Year relative to IPO year (0) -1 0 1 
Return on Assets (ROA, %)    
    Median 6.15 7.00 5.91 
    Mean 7.53 7.97 6.23 
    Std. Dev. 4.46 4.32 6.12 
    Min. 0 0.40 -46.67 
    Max. 24.64 28.19 24.93 
Median of difference in ROA 
--
0.49 
(0.464) 
-1.28 
(0.001) 
Mean of difference in ROA 
--
-1.74  0.44 
(0.001) (0.469) 
 
 
The table presents the median and mean return on assets (ROA) from one year before to one year after the 
IPO and the median and mean differences in ROA relative to year 0 for the 185 Chinese firms that went 
public during 1999 to 2001. The ROA is calculated as net income in year t divided by total assets excluding 
total cash at the end of year t. The p-values of the t-test of mean differences and the Wilcoxon signed-rank 
tests of median differences are reported in parentheses. Bold print indicates significance (two-tailed) at the 
1% level or better. 
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TABLE 6: The association between return on assets in the IPO year and changes in 
related party sales and purchases of goods and services in the pre-IPO 
period – a test of earnings management 
 
Explanatory variables 
Pre-IPO period 
 (t=-1 to t=0) 
Intercept 0.517 
(0.68) 
  
∆RPSALES [(t=0) – (t=-1)] 
 
 
  
0.166** 
(2.47) 
 
∆RPPUR [(t=0) – (t=-1)] 
 
-0.019 
(-0.37) 
  
∆NRPSALES [(t=0) – (t=-1)] 
 
 
0.091 
(1.55) 
 
RPSALES  (t=0) 0.326*** 
(2.72) 
  
NRPSALES  (t=0) 0.242** 
(2.41) 
  
RPPUR (t=0) -0.125 
(-0.36) 
  
DEBT (t=0) 0.035*** 
(4.23) 
  
SIZE (t=0) 0.009 
(0.83) 
  
No. of observations 185 
Adjusted R2 0.127 
 
The table reports the results for regression equation (1): 
 
ROAi,t=0  = a0 + a1 ∆RPSALESi,t=0 + a2 ∆RPPURi,t=0 + a3 ∆NRPSALESi,t=0 + a4 RPSALESi,t=0  
                      +   a5 NRPSALESi,t=0 +a6 RPPURi,t=0 +a7 DEBTi,t=0   +a8 SIZEi,t=0 + ei,t     
 
Here, ROAi,t=0  is IPO firm i’s return on assets in the IPO year (t=0), calculated as net income in year 0 
divided by total assets excluding total cash at the end of year 0, ∆RPSALESi,t=0  is IPO firm i’s change in the 
ratio of RP sales of goods and services to year-end total assets between years t=-1 and t=0, ∆RPPURi,t=0   is 
IPO firm i’s change in the ratio of RP purchases of goods and services to year-end total assets between 
years t=-1 and t=0, ∆NRPSALESi,t=0  is IPO firm i’s change in the ratio of non-related party (NRP) sales to 
year-end  total assets, between years t=-1 and t=0, RPSALESi,t=0  is IPO firm i’s level of RP sales in year 
t=0 scaled by year-end total assets, NRPSALESi,t=0  is IPO firm i’s level of NRP sales in year t=0 scaled by 
year-end total assets, RPPURi,t=0 is IPO firm i’s level of RP purchases in year t=0 scaled by year-end total 
assets, DEBTi,t=0   is IPO firm i’s long-term debt divided by total assets as of year-end 0, SIZEi,t=0  is IPO 
firm i’s natural logarithm of the market value of equity at year-end 0. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.      
** and *** denote two-tailed significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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TABLE 7: The association between IPO’s price-earnings ratio and changes in 
related party sales and purchases of goods and services in the pre-IPO 
period – a test of inflating IPO issuance price  
 
 
Explanatory variables 
Pre-IPO period 
 (t=-1 to t=0) 
  
Intercept 21.156*** 
(17.23) 
  
∆RPSALES [(t=0) – (t=-1)] 
 
 
  
33.989* 
(1.86) 
 
∆RPPUR [(t=0) – (t=-1)] -13.684 
(-1.15) 
  
∆NRPSALES [(t=0) – (t=-1)] 
 
 
3.012 
(1.23) 
 
RPSALES (t=0) 16.323** 
(2.54) 
  
NRPSALES (t=0) 1.623 
(0.93) 
  
RPPUR (t=0) -5.965 
(-0.98) 
  
PEC (t=0) 0.157** 
(2.33) 
  
No. of observations 185 
Adjusted R2 0.082 
 
The table reports the results for regression equation (2): 
 
PEi,t=0 = b0 + b1 ∆RPSALESi,t=0 + b2 ∆RPPURi,t=0 + b3 ∆NRPSALESit=0,+ b4 RPSALESi,t=0
                  + b5 NRPSALESi,t=0 + b6 RPPURi,t=0  + b7 PECi,t=0+ ei,t   
                                     
Here, PEi,t=0 is IPO firm i’s offering price per share divided by its earnings per share in the IPO year (t=0), 
∆RPSALESi,t=0  is IPO firm i’s change in the ratio of RP sales of goods and services to year-end total assets 
between years t=-1 and t=0, ∆RPPURi,t=0  is IPO firm i’s change in the ratio of RP purchases of goods and 
services to year-end total assets between years t=-1 and t=0,  ∆NRPSALESit=  is IPO firm i’s change in the 
ratio of non-related party (NRP) sales to year-end  total assets, between years t=-1 and t=0, RPSALESi,t=0  is 
IPO firm i’s level of RP sales in year t=0 scaled by year-end total assets, NRPSALESi,t=0   is IPO firm i’s level 
of NRP sales in year t=0 scaled by year-end total assets, RPPURi,t=0  is IPO firm i’s level of RP purchases in 
year t=0 scaled by year-end total assets, PECi,t=0 is the median PE ratio of all firms in the same industry as 
IPO firm i that went public during the prior 12 months relative to firm i’s IPO year (t=0). 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
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TABLE 8: Summary statistics and Chi-square test of the occurrence of an 
association between earnings management (EM) behavior via abnormal 
related party sales of goods and services in the pre-IPO period and 
tunneling via abnormal net outstanding corporate loans to parent 
companies in the post-IPO period among 185 Chinese IPO firms, 1999-
2001 
 
 Firms with post-
IPO tunneling  
( ∆NORECi,t=1 
>0) 
Firms without  
post-IPO 
tunneling 
(∆NORECi,t=1 
<=0) 
Total Chi-square 
test of 
independence 
(p-value) 
Firms with pre-IPO EM 
(∆RPSALESi,t=0 > 0) 
96 a
1.89% (1.28%) b
4.88% (2.38%) c
20 
2.26% (1.35%) 
-3.27% (-0.64%) 
116 
1.95% (1.30%) 
3.475% (2.09%) 
 
Firms without  
pre-IPO EM 
(∆RPSALESi,t=0 <=0) 
41 
-5.72% (-0.96%) 
2.62% (0.84%) 
28 
-1.92% (0.00%) 
-2.16% (-0.71%) 
69 
-4.178% (0.00%) 
0.674% (0.00%) 
 
Total 
137 
-0.39% (0.61%) 
4.20% (1.90%) 
48 
-0.18% (0.00%) 
-2.62% (-0.59%) 
185 
15.963* -0.34% (0.98%) 
(p=0.000) 2.40% (1.56%) 
 
 
Each cell reports the following:  
 
a the number of sample IPO firms (first row), 
 
b the mean (median) of ∆RPSALESi,t=0,  our measure of earnings management in the pre-IPO period, is IPO 
firm i’s change in the ratio of RP sales of goods and services to year-end total assets, between year t= -1 
and t= 0 (second row), 
 
c the mean (median) of ∆NORECi,t=1,  our measure of tunneling in the post-IPO period, is IPO firm i’s 
change in the ratio of net outstanding corporate loans (other receivables – other payables) to year-end total 
assets, between year t= 0 and t= +1, due solely to RPTs with parent companies (third row).  
 
* denotes two-tailed significance at the 1% level or better. 
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TABLE 9: The association between changes in related party’s net outstanding 
corporate loans and changes in related party’s sales and purchases of 
goods and services – a test of tunneling 
 
Explanatory variables Post-IPO 
period 
(t=0 to t=+1) 
Intercept -0.124 
(-0.68) 
  
∆RPSALES [(t=0) – (t=-1)] 0.496** 
(2.32) 
  
∆RPPUR [(t=0) – (t=-1)] 0.033 
(1.36) 
  
∆NRPSALES [(t=0) – (t=-1)] 0.156 
(0.98) 
  
∆RPSALES [(t=1) – (t= 0)] -0.013 
(-0.29) 
  
∆RPPUR [(t=1) – (t=0)] 0.001 
(0.26) 
  
∆NRPSALES [(t=1) – (t= 0)] 0.005 
(0.30) 
  
CFOi,t=1 -0.148** 
(-1.98) 
  
∆CFOi,t=1 0.076 
(1.01) 
  
DEBTi,t=1 -0.017 
(-0.21) 
  
∆DEBTi,t=1 -0.021 
(-0.43) 
  
MBEi,t=1 0.005 
(1.58) 
  
SIZEi,t=1 0.007 
(0.72) 
  
No. of observations 185 
Adjusted R2 0.033 
 
The table reports the results for regression equations (3): 
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∆NORECi,t=1 =d0 + d1 ∆RPSALESi,t=0+ d2 ∆RPPURi,t=0 + d3 ∆NRPSALESi,t=0 +d4 ∆RPSALESi,t=1 
                                           + d5 ∆RPPURi,t=1 +d6 ∆NRPSALESi,t=1 + d7 CFOi,t=1  +d8 ∆CFOi,t=1 
                            + d9 DEBTi,t=1   +d10 ∆DEBTi,t=1   + d11 MBEi,t=1+d12 SIZEi,t=1+ ei,t  
  
Here, ∆NORECi,t=1,our measure of tunneling, is IPO firm i’s change in the ratio of net corporate loans (other 
receivables – other payables) to year-end total assets, between years t=0 and year  t=+1 due solely to RPTs 
with parent companies. ∆RPSALESi,t=0, our measure of earnings management in the pre-IPO period, is IPO 
firm i’s change in the ratio of RP sales of goods and  services to year-end total assets, between years t=-1 
and t=0. ∆RPPURi,t=0  is IPO firm i’s change in the ratio of RP purchases of goods and services to year-end 
total assets, between years t=-1 and t=0. ∆NRPSALESi,t=0 is IPO firm i’s change in the ratio of non-related 
party (NRP) sales of goods and services to year-end total assets, between years t=-1 and t=0. 
∆RPSALESi,t=1,  ∆RPPURi,t=1. and ∆NRPSALESi,t=1 are included in the post-IPO period (t=0 to t=+1) 
regression as three additional explanatory variables. CFOi,t=1 is IPO firm i’s cash flow from operations in 
year t scaled by total assets as of year-end t=+1. ∆CFOi,t=1 is change in CFOi  between years t=0 and t=+1. 
DEBTi,t=1is IPO firm i’s long-term debt divided by total assets as of year-end t=+1. ∆DEBTi,t=1  is change in 
DEBT i between years t=0 and t=+1. MBEi,t=1 is the market value of equity divided by the book value of 
equity at year-end t=+1. SIZEi,t=1 is IPO firm i’s natural logarithm of the market value of equity at year-end 
t=+1. 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ** denotes two-tailed significance at the 5% level. 
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TABLE 10: The association between post-IPO firms’ market returns and changes in 
related party sales and purchases of goods and services in the pre-IPO 
period – a post-IPO test of the implications of tunneling for the capital 
markets 
  
Explanatory variables 
12-month BHR 
post-IPO 
24-month 
BHR post-
PO I
   
Intercept 0.461 
(
 
0.59) 
1.359 
(
 
1.21) 
 
∆RPSALES [(t=0) – (t=-1)] -0.313** 
(
 
-2.45) 
-0.596** 
(
 
-2.36) 
 
∆NOREC [(t=1) – (t= 0)] -0.171 
(
 
-0.41) 
-0.853** 
(
 
-2.37) 
 
Dummy1 -0.064** 
(
 
-2.01) 
-0.103** 
(
 
-1.98) 
 
Dummy2 -0.011* 
(
 
-1.85) 
-0.172* 
(
 
-1.89) 
 
Dummy3 0.046 
(
 
0.96) 
-0.008** 
(
 
2.19) 
 
∆RPPUR [(t=0) – (t=-1)] 0.162 
( 1.26) 
0.319* 
( 1.75)  
∆NRPSALES [(t=0) – (t=-1)] 0.058 
(
 
1.00) 
0.053 
(
 
0.65) 
 
∆NOREC [(t=0) – (t=-1)] 0.489 
(
 
1.22) 
-0.608 
(
 
-1.07) 
 
∆RPSALES [(t=1) – (t=0)] -0.309 
( -0.70) 
-0.255 
( -0.42)  
∆RPPUR [(t=1) – (t=0)] -0.003 
(
 
-0.09) 
-0.010 
(
 
-0.19) 
 
∆NRPSALES [(t=1) – (t= 0)] 0.172 
(
 
1.23) 
0.284 
(
 
1.45) 
 
IPORET -0.143*** 
(
 
-3.86) 
-0.182*** 
(
 
-3.52) 
 
MARKET 0.940*** 
(
 
12.30) 
1.326*** 
(
 
15.19) 
 
ROA 2.198** 
( 2.05) 
1.567 
( 1.05)  
MBE 0.067*** 
(
 
3.98) 
0.043* 
(
 
1.83) 
 
SIZE -0.028 
(-0.81) 
-0.077 
(1.55) 
No. of observations 185 185 
Adjusted R2 0.650 0.717 
                  
The table reports the results for regression equation (4): 
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BHRi = f0 + f1 ∆RPSALESi,t=0 + f2 ∆NORECi,t=1 + f3 Dummy1+ f4 Dummy2 
                + f5 Dummy3 + f6 ∆RPPURi,t=0+ f7 ∆NRPSALESi,t=0   + f8 ∆NORECi,t=0 
                +  f9 ∆RPSALESi,t=1 +  f10 ∆RPPURi,t=1+ f11 ∆NRPSALESi,t=1 + f12 IPORETi 
                + f MARKET13 i + f14 ROAi,t=0  + f15 MBEi,t=0 + f SIZE16 i,t=0 +  ei,t                     
   
Here, BHRi is IPO firm i’s 12-month or 24-month post-IPO buy-and-hold raw return starting four months 
after the first fiscal year-end subsequent to the IPO. ∆RPSALESi,t=0, our measure of abnormal RP sales of 
goods and services in the pre-IPO period, is IPO firm i’s change in the ratio of RP sales to year-end total 
assets, between years t=-1 to t=0. ∆NORECi,t=1, our measure of abnormal RP net outstanding corporate 
loans in the post-IPO period, is IPO firm i’s change in the ratio of net other receivables to year-end total 
assets, between years t= 0 to t= +1. Dummy1 equals one when both ∆RPSALESi,t=0 and ∆NORECi,t=1 are 
positive and zero otherwise. Dummy2 equals one when ∆RPSALESi,t=0 is positive but ∆NORECi,t=1 is non-
positive and zero otherwise. Dummy3 equals one when ∆RPSALESi,t=0 is non-positive and ∆NORECi,t=1 is 
positive and zero otherwise. ∆RPPURi,t=0 is IPO firm i’s change in the ratio of RP purchases of goods and 
services to year-end total assets in the pre-IPO period (t=-1 to t=0). ∆NRPSALESi,t=0 is IPO firm i’s change 
in the ratio of non-RP sales of goods and services scaled by year-end total assets, for the pre-IPO period (t=-
1 to t=0). ∆NORECi,t=0 is as defined above, measured for the pre-IPO period (t=-1 to t=0). ∆RPSALESi,t=1, 
∆RPPURi,t=1 and ∆NRPSALESi,t=1, are as defined above, measured for the post-IPO period (t=0 to t=+1). 
IPORETi is IPO firm i’s market-adjusted initial trading day return. MARKETi is the Shanghai stock market 
value-weighted return for the same interval as the dependent variable. ROAi,t=0 is IPO firm i’s return on 
assets (net income over total assets excluding total cash at year-end 0) in the pre-IPO period. MBEi,t=0 is IPO 
firm i’s market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at year-end 0. SIZEi,t=0  is the natural 
logarithm of IPO firm i’s market value of equity at year-end 0. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** denote two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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